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Multiple Mechanisms of Consciousness: The Neural
Correlates of Emotional Awareness
Jayna M. Amting,1,2* Steven G. Greening,2* and Derek G. V. Mitchell1,2
1

Department of Psychiatry and 2Department of Anatomy and Cell Biology, Schulich School of Medicine and Dentistry, The University of Western Ontario,
London, Ontario, Canada N6A 5A5

Emotional stimuli, including facial expressions, are thought to gain rapid and privileged access to processing resources in the brain. Despite this
access, we are conscious of only a fraction of the myriad of emotion-related cues we face everyday. It remains unclear, therefore, what the
relationship is between activity in neural regions associated with emotional representation and the phenomenological experience of emotional
awareness. We used functional magnetic resonance imaging and binocular rivalry to delineate the neural correlates of awareness of conflicting
emotional expressions in humans. Behaviorally, fearful faces were significantly more likely to be perceived than disgusted or neutral faces.
Functionally,increasedactivitywasobservedinregionsassociatedwithfacialexpressionprocessing,includingtheamygdalaandfusiformgyrus
during emotional awareness. In contrast, awareness of neutral faces and suppression of fearful faces were associated with increased activity
in dorsolateral prefrontal and inferior parietal cortices. The amygdala showed increased functional connectivity with ventral visual system
regions during fear awareness and increased connectivity with perigenual prefrontal cortex (pgPFC; Brodmann’s area 32/10) when fear was
suppressed. Despite being prioritized for awareness, emotional items were associated with reduced activity in areas considered critical for
consciousness. Contributions to consciousness from bottom-up and top-down neural regions may be additive, such that increased activity in
specialized regions within the extended ventral visual system may reduce demands on a frontoparietal system important for awareness. The
possibility is raised that interactions between pgPFC and the amygdala, previously implicated in extinction, may also influence whether or not an
emotional stimulus is accessible to consciousness.

Introduction
The conscious perception of visual stimuli is thought to be an adaptation that complements reflexive unconscious representation, allowing for more sophisticated planning and action (Crick and Koch,
2003). Visual awareness is associated with increased cortical activity
(Bar et al., 2001), particularly in category-selective “bottom-up” sensory areas within the ventral visual system (Tong et al., 1998; GrillSpector et al., 2000). Although increased stimulus representation is
considered a prerequisite for conscious perception, it does not inevitably lead to awareness. Robust activity to unperceived stimuli has
been observed throughout visual cortex (Leopold and Logothetis,
1996), fusiform gyrus (Moutoussis and Zeki, 2002), and motor cortex (Dehaene et al., 1998). Thus, awareness depends not only on
activation in category-selective regions, but also on input from superordinate structures. Candidate regions for performing this “topdown” function include lateral prefrontal and inferior parietal
cortices (Beck et al., 2001; Vuilleumier et al., 2001a). Indeed, a recent
lesion study suggests a causal role for prefrontal cortex in allowing
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stimuli access to consciousness (Del Cul et al., 2009). Although the
precise functional contribution of these neural regions remain unclear (Rees, 2007), frontoparietal areas may facilitate awareness by
amplifying relevant sensory processes (Dehaene and Naccache,
2001) or biasing the content of awareness toward internal representations (Lumer et al., 1998).
Whereas the neural regions that make bottom-up contributions
to visual awareness appear to be category selective (Lumer et al.,
1998; Tong et al., 1998), top-down frontoparietal regions appear to
factor in consciousness in a stimulus-independent or “generic”
manner (Beck et al., 2001; Rees, 2007). However, the neural basis of
visual awareness has been examined in only a limited range of stimuli. The possibility therefore remains that frontoparietal contributions to consciousness vary as a function of the properties of the
stimuli subject to awareness, suppression, or both. Because of the
special processing properties of emotions (Vuilleumier and Driver,
2007), comparing emotional versus neutral facial expressions is particularly promising for extending current models of consciousness.
Studies of attention suggest that emotional stimuli receive special access
to representation in subcortical areas (Vuilleumier et al., 2001b) even
without normal awareness (Vuilleumier et al., 2002). However, it is
unclear whether, in the absence of changes in stimulus properties or
task demands, subcortical areas contribute to consciousness or alter
the contribution of other structures implicated in awareness.
In the present functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI)
study, we used binocular rivalry to test two opposing predictions
about emotional consciousness. If top-down structures make
a generic (emotion-independent) contribution to emotional

10040 • J. Neurosci., July 28, 2010 • 30(30):10039 –10047

Amting et al. • Neural Correlates of Emotional Awareness

awareness, then activity in bottom-up
(ventral visual) but not top-down (frontoparietal) areas should vary as a function
of the perceived facial expression. Alternatively, top-down and bottom-up contributions may be additive, such that
enhanced contributions from specialized
bottom-up structures place fewer demands on a generic top-down mechanism
for awareness. Lastly, we tested the intriguing hypothesis that, given the role
of perigenual prefrontal cortex [pgPFC;
Brodmann’s area (BA) 32/10] in emotion
regulation (Ochsner and Gross, 2005) and
extinction (Quirk and Gehlert, 2003), enhanced functional connectivity between
the amygdala and pgPFC would be associated with the suppression of fear from
awareness.

Materials and Methods
Subjects. Sixteen healthy human subjects (6
male and 10 female) with a mean age of 24.88
(range 20 –32; SD 2.71) completed the study.
All subjects granted informed consent, were in
good health, and had no past history of psychiatric problems, neurological disease, or head
injury as determined by screening and interview using the Structured Clinical Interview
for DSM-IV (Diagnostic and Statistical Manual
of Mental Disorders, 4th Edition). All subjects
had normal or corrected to normal vision and
were screened for color blindness using the
Ishihara color blindness test. All subjects were
right handed as determined by the Edinburgh Figure 1. The binocular rivalry task. An illustration of the experimental scenario with a sample stimulus in composite form,
handedness inventory. The study was ap- involving superimposed red and blue facial expressions and deconstructed into its constituent parts. Participants wore red/blue
proved by the Health Sciences Research Ethics three-dimensional glasses to filter retinal input. In this example, the left eye receives input from the blue fearful facial expression,
Board at the University of Western Ontario, while at the same time a red disgusted facial expression is input to the right eye. Note that input from each eye goes to both
hemispheres of the brain. This manipulation often allows one of the expressions to reach awareness while the other is suppressed
London, Ontario, Canada.
Stimuli. A binocular rivalry task was used to from consciousness.
manipulate awareness of facial expressions.
paired with the same stimulus; and (3) a neutral facial expression paired
Binocular rivalry occurs when discrepant images are presented to each
with the same stimulus. The rivalrous conditions included these: (1) a fearful
eye. This manipulation creates perceptual rivalry, in which one image is
facial expression paired with a neutral facial expression (a red fearful face
perceived while the other is suppressed from awareness. Because the
paired with a blue neutral face and vice versa); (2) a disgusted facial exprestechnique varies visual awareness while holding stimulus input and task
sion paired with a neutral facial expression; and (3) a fearful facial expression
demands constant, it is considered an effective means for exploring visual
paired with a disgusted facial expression. In each case, the two superimposed
consciousness (Tong et al., 2006). Experimental conditions included
faces that formed a stimulus, whether nonrivalrous or rivalrous, were of the
competing displays of superimposed red and blue facial expressions (see
same actor. In each condition, the red-blue designation of each face was
Fig. 1). To induce binocular rivalry, participants wore glasses with a red
counterbalanced (i.e., for each actor, there was one trial involving a red
filter over one eye and a blue filter over the other. The filter/eye pair was
fearful face paired with a blue neutral face and a second trial involving a blue
counterbalanced across subjects (i.e., right eye with red filter and left eye
fearful face paired with a red neutral face). Thus, for each actor (48), there
with blue filter or vice versa). Large numbers of unique individual stimuli
were 12 presentations (6 stimuli presented twice to balance color). Altowere included to minimize habituation (Wright et al., 2001) and also
gether, there were 96 trials for each condition for a total of 576 trials divided
served to reduce the potential influence of perceptual memory traces on
equally into 6 runs.
subsequent awareness (cf. Pearson and Brascamp, 2008; Sterzer and
Task design. Each trial began with a fixation point (500 ms), followed
Rees, 2008). Consequently, facial expressions were taken from 48 differby the image of two superimposed facial expressions (rivalrous or nonent actors (24 males) from the empirically validated NimStim Face Stimrivalrous; 500 ms) and then a screen listing the four potential emotional
ulus Set (Tottenham et al., 2002) and the Karolinska Directed Emotional
perception choices (2250 ms). During binocular rivalry, perceptual domFaces (Lundqvist et al., 1998). The facial images were cropped to remove
inance spontaneously alternates every few seconds between one image
the hair and neck to eliminate extraneous stereotypic features. Color
and the other (Tong et al., 2006). As with other recent fMRI studies with
filters were then applied in Adobe Photoshop to render sets of “red only”
similar considerations (e.g., Williams et al., 2004), a short presentation
and “blue only” stimuli. Images were rendered semitransparent, stantime for each stimulus was chosen specifically to help insure that particdardized for luminosity and contrast, and superimposed on one another.
ipants would experience a single unchanging percept on each trial. While
There were a total of six different conditions (three nonrivalrous conundergoing fMRI, participants indicated whether the facial expression
ditions and three rivalrous conditions). The nonrivalrous conditions inpresented was neutral, fearful, disgusted, or blended (if they could not
cluded the following: (1) a fearful facial expression paired with the same
stimulus (one in red and one in blue); (2) a disgusted facial expression
distinguish one single emotion) via button press at the end of every trial.
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Disgusted faces were chosen to complement the fearful and neutral stimuli for two main reasons. First, like fearful stimuli, disgusted faces involve
complex pattern information and luminance contrast edges within the
expressive features; i.e., for both fearful and disgusted faces, the mouth,
nose, eye, and eyebrows all change position relative to their location on a
neutral expression (Ekman and Friesen, 1975). Because both disgusted
and fearful faces involve this complex pattern information, it is less likely
that participants would make rule-based (e.g., if eye brows deviate from
center respond “fear”) rather than emotional discriminations. This is
particularly true in the context of piecemeal rivalry, where if only fearful
and neutral expressions were present, participants may be more likely to
form a response bias to label blended percepts as “fearful” by default.
Second, relative to fearful faces, disgusted expressions are thought to
activate a partially dissociable network of neural regions (Calder et al.,
2001) and receive less prioritized access to processing resources (Anderson et al., 2003). There were 96 trials in each condition for a total of 576
trials divided equally into 6 runs. Within each run, the six different stimulus conditions were intermixed, presented in random order, and balanced. The runs themselves were presented in pseudorandom order. The
stimuli were projected through a data projector onto a screen that could
be viewed by the subject via a mirror positioned above the head-coil in
the MRI scanner. Before entering the scanner, subjects performed a 24
trial training version that included samples of each condition that were
not used in the experiment. The task was programmed using E-Prime
software (Schneider et al., 2002).
Behavioral data analysis. Because of the possibility that perception of
an expression was driven in part by emotion recognition difficulty (e.g.,
the expressions may differ intrinsically in the ease with which they are
identified), we controlled for the ability to correctly identify fearful (F),
neutral (N), and disgusted (D) faces in nonrivalrous conditions. Thus, a
“fear awareness score” was derived by dividing the number of times fear
was present and perceived in rivalrous conditions (fear paired with neutral or disgusted faces) by the number of correct identifications of fear
made in nonrivalrous conditions [(FNF ⫹ FDF)/FF]. A disgust awareness score was derived by dividing the number of times disgust was
present and perceived in rivalrous conditions (disgust paired with neutral or fearful faces) divided by the number of correct identifications of
disgust made in nonrivalrous conditions [(DND ⫹ FDD)/DD]. A neutral awareness score was derived in the same fashion [(DNN ⫹ FNN)/
NN]. A repeated-measures ANOVA was used to determine whether the
three awareness scores differed significantly. In addition, to examine the
relative likelihood of unresolved rivalry across conditions, a second
ANOVA was conducted examining the number of “blended” responses
across the three rivalrous conditions (fear paired with disgust; fear paired
with neutral; disgust paired with neutral). Follow-up paired t tests were
conducted to delineate the nature of significant effects.
MRI data acquisition. Subjects were scanned during task performance
using a 3T Siemens scanner with a 32 channel head coil. fMRI images
were taken with a T2*-gradient echo-planar imaging sequence [repetition time ⫽ 3000 ms; echo time ⫽ 30 ms; 120 ⫻ 120 matrix; field of view
(FOV) ⫽ 24 cm]. Complete brain coverage was obtained with 45 ascending interleaved slices of 2 ⫻ 2 mm in plane with a slice thickness of 2.5
mm, which formed voxels of 2 ⫻ 2 ⫻ 2.5 mm. A high-resolution, T1weighted, anatomical scan was obtained covering the whole brain (repetition time ⫽ 2300 ms, echo time ⫽ 4.25 ms; FOV ⫽ 25.6 cm; 192 axial
slices; voxel size ⫽ 1 mm isovoxels; 256 ⫻ 256 matrix).
fMRI analysis. Individual and group analyses were conducted using
Analysis of Functional NeuroImages software (AFNI) (Cox, 1996). The
first four “dummy” volumes of each of the six runs were discarded to
insure that magnetization equilibrium was reached. Motion correction
was performed by registering all volumes to the first functional volume
acquired following the anatomical scan. The dataset for each subject was
spatially smoothed (using an isotropic 4 mm Gaussian kernel) and the
time series data were normalized by dividing the signal intensity of a
voxel at each time point by the mean signal intensity of that voxel for each
run and multiplying the result by 100. The resultant regression coefficients represented the percentage signal change from the mean activity.
Regressors for each of the 12 experimental conditions were created using
a fixed duration epoch design by convolving the stimulus events of inter-
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Figure 2. Fear is prioritized for awareness. Behavioral results demonstrated that participants
weresignificantlymorelikelytobeconsciousoffearfulfacialexpressionsthanbothdisgusted(t(15) ⫽
2.26, p ⫽ 0.039) and neutral (t(15) ⫽ 2.83, p ⫽ 0.013) expressions when paired with a competing
facial expression. Error bars depict the SEM between subjects (8 ⫽ p ⬍ 0.05).
Table 1. Contrast tests for perceived fear and disgust
Anatomical location
Perceived fear vs unperceived fear contrast
Perceived fear ⬎ unperceived fear
Amygdala*
Unperceived fear ⬎ perceived fear
Perigenual PFC
Perceived disgust vs unperceived disgust contrast
Perceived disgust ⬎ unperceived disgust
Fusiform gyrus*
Unperceived disgust ⬎ perceived disgust
Inferior parietal cortex
Emotion suppression with neutral awareness ⬎
neutral neutral
Middle frontal gyrus
Middle frontal gyrus %
Inferior frontal gyrus
Insula
Insula
Precuneus

L/R BA

R

x

y

16

L

24

⫺3

L

37

⫺35

R

40

R
L
R
L
R
R

9/44
48
9/45 ⫺40
44
50
13 ⫺32
13
30
7
6

z

t value

⫺8 ⫺12 4.29
33

7 6.79

48 ⫺22 5.78

62 ⫺40

9
28
12
18
20
67

38 6.90

39
32
20
6
4
42

8.13
7.71
6.31
6.64
6.11
6.60

Significant neural regions revealed by the perceived fear versus unperceived fear, perceived disgust versus unperceived disgust, and neutral awareness with emotional suppression contrast tests. Displayed in the table are hemispheric location (L, left; R, right), Brodmann’s area (BA), Montreal Neurological Institute coordinates at the center
of mass (x,y,z), and maximum activity (F value) for each significant cluster. p ⬍ 0.001; p ⬍ 0.05, corrected;
*p ⬍ 0.01; %uncorrected.

est (i.e., 500 ms of superimposed facial expression presentation) with a
gamma-variate basis function to account for the slow hemodynamic
response. The BOLD response was fitted to each of the 13 regressors to
perform linear regression modeling. The rivalrous disgust-neutral condition (DN) yielded three possible regressors; participants perceived either disgusted (DND), neutral (DNN), or blended (DNB) faces. The
rivalrous fearful-neutral condition (FN) also yielded three regressors;
participants perceived either fearful (FNF), neutral (FNN), or blended
(FNB) faces. The rivalrous fear-disgust condition (FD) yielded three possible regressors; participants perceived either fearful (FDF), disgusted
(FDD), or blended (FDB) faces. There were also three regressors generated from nonrivalrous pairings of fearful (FF), disgusted (DD), and
neutral (NN) faces. Errors were defined as those trials in which participants indicated awareness for an emotion that was not present. Such
trials, along with responses made outside of a 2250 ms time period, were
modeled separately as regressors of no interest. To account for voxelwise
correlated drifting, a baseline plus linear drift and quadratic trend were
modeled to the time series of each voxel. This produced a ␤ coefficient
and t value for each voxel and regressor. To perform the group analyses,
each individual’s data were transformed into the standard space of Talairach and Tournoux. This individual subject analysis was followed by
the group analyses described below.
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Group analysis. Two contrast tests were performed to examine neural activity associated
with the awareness of fearful and disgusted facial expressions. A perceived fear versus unperceived fear contrast compared the mean blood
oxygenation level-dependent (BOLD) response associated with all rivalrous trials in
which fear was present and perceived (FNF and
FDF) with rivalrous trials in which fear was
present but not perceived (FNN and FDD). A
contrast examining perceived fear versus unperceived fear was defined by the following
equation: [(FNF ⫹ FDF)/2] ⫺ [(FNN ⫹
FDD)/2]. The perceived disgust versus unperceived disgust contrast compared the mean
BOLD response associated with all rivalrous
trials in which disgust was present and perceived (DND and FDD) with all rivalrous trials
in which disgust was present but not perceived
(DNN and FDF). The contrast examining perceived disgust versus unperceived disgust was
defined by the following equation: [(DND ⫹
FDD)/2] ⫺ [(DNN ⫹ FDF)/2].
Following the suggestion of an anonymous
reviewer, we performed a third contrast to dissociate brain activity specifically related to the
awareness of a neutral stimulus while suppressing an emotional stimulus. At the same time,
the contrast allowed us to control for activity
associated with the perception of a neutral
stimulus in the absence of emotional rivalry.
This contrast compared the BOLD response in
all conditions where an emotional face was
present but unperceived (i.e., a fearful or dis- Figure 3. Activityinbothbottom-upandtop-downneuralregionsmodulatedasafunctionofemotionalawareness.a–c,Thecontrast
gusted face was suppressed) and a neutral face of fear awareness (perceived fear minus unperceived fear) revealed greater activity in the right amygdala ( p ⬍ 0.01, a) when fear was
was perceived (FNN and DNN) relative to tri- perceivedandgreateractivationoftheleftperigenualprefrontalcortex(b)whenfearwaspresentbutunperceived.Thecontrastofdisgust
als in which only neutral faces were present and awareness (perceived disgust minus unperceived, but present, disgust) showed greater activation in left fusiform gyrus (c) when disgust
perceived (NN). This contrast of perceived was perceived ( p ⬍ 0.01). d, e, The main effect of perceived emotion revealed greater activity during the awareness of fearful and
neutral with emotion suppression versus neu- disgusted faces versus neutral ones in left inferior occipital lobe (d) and the left fusiform gyrus (e). The y-axis depicts percentage signal
¥
8
tral only was defined by the following equation: change (% sig. change) in BOLD response; error bars depict SEM between subjects (*p ⬍ 0.001, p ⬍ 0.01, p ⬍ 0.05).
[(FNN ⫹ DNN)/2] ⫺ NN.
In addition, a 3 (perceived emotion: fearful,
right amygdala during trials in which fear was perceived relative to the
disgusted, or neutral facial expressions) ⫻ 3 (unperceived emotion: fearwhen fear was present but unperceived. Each individual’s BOLD signal
ful, disgusted, or neutral facial expressions) ANOVA was conducted on
time series was converted into standardized Talairach space according to
the regression coefficients derived from the fMRI analysis (described
their anatomical dataset. The right amygdala functional mask (SEED
above). For the main effect of perceived emotion, main effect of unperregion) was then separately paired with each individual’s dataset, the
ceived emotion, and interaction between the perceived and unperceived
time series was extracted, and the trend was removed from the resulting
emotions, regions significantly active at a threshold of p ⬍ 0.001 were
time series. The psychophysiological variable was created as a product of
examined. For a priori regions of interest (ROI) including the amygdala,
a deconvolved extracted time series of the seed region and a vector coded
fusiform gyrus, and anterior insula, a more liberal threshold was used
for the desired condition (1 for the perceived fear condition, ⫺1 for
( p ⬍ 0.01) and reported where significant. To correct for multiple comconditions when fear was unperceived, 0 for all other conditions). The
variable created for the incongruent and congruent conditions were
parisons, a spatial clustering operation was performed at a threshold of
paired to the detrended SEED time series. To control for global drifting,
p ⬍ 0.001 ( p ⬍ 0.05 corrected) using AlphaSim with 1000 Monte Carlo
the average signal across the whole brain (global signal) was used as a
simulations taking into account the entire echoplanar image matrix. For
covariate in the correlation analysis. A voxelwise correlation analysis was
significantly active clusters, follow-up analyses using paired t tests were
conducted between each individual voxel’s time series and that of the
performed to delineate the nature of the main effects and interaction.
specified SEED region. The proportion of the variation that could be
Context-dependent connectivity analysis (psychophysiological interacattributed to the correlation with the SEED was determined by squaring
tion). One of the objectives of the current study was to identify neural
the resulting correlation coefficient. The correlation coefficients were
regions that are important for selecting between conflicting emotional
converted to a Gaussian variable using a Fisher transformation formula
stimuli for awareness. Given the role of the amygdala in processing emoto reduce the skew and normalize the distribution. To identify regions
tional facial expressions (Adolphs et al., 1994; LeDoux, 1996), we prethat showed a significant alteration in correlated activity with right amygdicted that areas involved in the conscious perception of fear would show
dala across perceived and unperceived conditions, a t test was performed
enhanced connectivity with the amygdala during trials of perceived relon the transformed correlation coefficients.
ative to unperceived fear. Context-dependent changes in functional connectivity were assessed using a psychophysiological interaction model
Results
(Context-Dependent Correlation Analysis by Gang Chen, National InBehavioral data
stitute of Mental Health, Bethesda, MD; http://afni.nimh.nih.gov/
A repeated-measures ANOVA examining the response awareness
sscc/gangc/CD-CorrAna.html) that identified brain regions showing sigscores (i.e., scores designed to control for individual differences
nificantly altered functional connectivity (correlated activity) with the
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Table 2. Main effect of perceived emotion
Anatomical location
Perceived fearful and disgusted faces ⬎
neutral faces
Inferior occipital cortex ␤
Fusiform gyrus ␤
Inferior frontal gyrus
Declive
Perceived disgusted faces ⬎ fearful and
neutral faces
Postcentral gyrus
Cuneus
Perceived neutral faces ⬎ perceived fearful
and disgusted faces
Middle frontal gyrus
Middle frontal gyrus
Middle frontal gyrus
Perigenual PFC
Perigenual PFC
Posterior cingulate gyrus
Inferior parietal cortex
Inferior parietal cortex*
Superior parietal cortex
Superior occipital cortex
Middle temporal gyrus
Middle temporal gyrus ␣
Middle temporal gyrus
Superior temporal gyrus
Lentiform nucleus ␣
Perceived neutral and disgusted faces ⬎
fearful faces
Lingual gyrus
Cuneus

L/R BA

x

y

z

F value

L
L
L
R

18
⫺34 ⫺90 ⫺10
37
⫺36 ⫺46 ⫺18
44/45 ⫺44
15
22
9
10 ⫺73 ⫺31

L
L

3
18

⫺49 ⫺22
⫺13 ⫺92

L
R
L
L
L/R
L/R
R
L
L
L
R
R
L
L
R

9
8
8
32
32
31
40
40
7
19
21
21
21
22

⫺35
26
⫺22
⫺6
0
0
52
⫺58
⫺19
⫺40
59
60
⫺62
⫺55
29

L/R 18
L
18

22.87
16.99
30.05
17.49

49 19.76
18 13.62

29
40 32.60
18
50 22.21
28
51 19.46
36
20 17.37
40
3 15.40
⫺39
39 38.23
⫺53
32 41.97
⫺42
37 13.62
⫺58
66 15.50
⫺79
27 20.14
⫺26 ⫺19 20.16
⫺43 ⫺3 15.12
⫺26 ⫺16 19.28
⫺20
9 12.38
⫺18
8 33.22

0 ⫺73
⫺10 ⫺73

2 23.64
15 13.05

Areas showing a significant main effect of perceived emotion following the perceived emotion ⫻ unperceived
emotion (3 ⫻ 3 ANOVA) whole-brain analysis; p ⬍ 0.05, corrected; ␤perceived disgusted faces ⬎ fearful faces ⬎
neutral faces; *perceived neutral faces ⬎ fearful faces ⬎ disgusted faces; ␣perceived neutral faces ⬎ disgusted
faces ⬎ fearful faces; L, left; R, right.

in emotion recognition) was significant (F(2,30) ⫽ 3.83, p ⬍ 0.05).
Follow-up paired t tests revealed that, when present, fearful faces
were consciously perceived [(FNF ⫹ FDF)/FF; M ⫽ 1.20, SD ⫽
0.27] significantly more than disgusted [(DND ⫹ FDD)/DD;
M ⫽ 1.05, SD ⫽ 0.17; t(15) ⫽ 2.26, p ⬍ 0.05] and neutral faces
[(DNN ⫹ FNN)/NN; M ⫽ 0.92, SD ⫽ 0.28; t(15) ⫽ 2.83, p ⫽
0.01]. The results of this analysis suggest that when multiple facial
expressions are present, even emotional ones, fearful faces are
most likely to reach awareness (Fig. 2). The second ANOVA revealed that the number of blended responses across the three
rivalrous conditions did not differ significantly (F(2,30) ⫽ 1.76,
p ⬎ 0.18): mean blended responses to fearful faces paired with
neutral faces was 6.94 (SD ⫽ 9.54); mean blended responses to
fearful faces paired with disgusted faces was 10.75 (SD ⫽ 11.44);
mean blended responses to disgusted faces paired with neutral
faces was 11.25 (SD ⫽ 14.19).
fMRI results
Contrast tests
Perceived fearful faces versus unperceived fearful faces. The perceived
fearful faces versus unperceived fearful faces contrast (Table 1) revealed significantly greater activity in the amygdala ( p ⬍ 0.01) (Fig.
3a) when participants were aware of fearful faces. When participants
were unaware of a fearful face being present (i.e., fear suppression),
there was greater activity in the left pgPFC ( p ⬍ 0.001) (Fig. 3b).
Perceived disgusted faces versus unperceived disgusted faces. The
contrast of perceived disgusted faces versus unperceived disgusted

faces (Table 1) revealed significantly greater activation in fusiform
gyrus when a disgusted face was perceived ( p ⬍ 0.01) (Fig. 3c).
When a disgusted face was present but unperceived, there was
greater activation in right inferior parietal cortex (BA 40; p ⬍ 0.001).
Perceived neutral with emotion suppression versus neutral only.
We conducted a contrast targeting neural regions specifically related to the suppression of an emotional percept in favor of a
neutral one. At the same time, we controlled for activity associated with neutral stimulus perception in the absence of emotional
rivalry. This contrast identified significantly greater activation in
bilateral middle frontal gyrus ( p ⬍ 0.001) (see Fig. 5), inferior
frontal gyrus, bilateral insula, and precuneus when emotional
faces were being suppressed (Table 1). There were no clusters
with significantly greater activity in the neutral only condition
compared with the perceived neutral with emotion suppression
condition.
ANOVA
Main effect of perceived emotion
Areas showing a significant main effect of perceived emotion
include widespread regions of prefrontal cortex, parietal cortex,
and the dorsal and ventral visual system ( p ⬍ 0.001). Pairwise
comparisons were performed to delineate the nature of the main
effects. The delineation revealed three primary patterns of activity: (1) areas showing significantly greater activity for perceived
fearful and disgusted faces relative to neutral faces; (2) areas
showing greater activity to perceived disgusted faces relative to
perceived neutral and fearful faces; (3) areas showing greater activity to perceived neutral faces relative to perceived fearful and
disgusted faces. These regions and their distinct pattern of results
are detailed in Table 2.
Of particular interest, left inferior occipital cortex (BA 18)
(Fig. 3d) and left fusiform gyrus (BA 37) (Fig. 3e) showed significantly greater activity for fearful and disgusted faces relative to
neutral faces and greater activity to disgusted relative to fearful
faces (disgusted ⬎ fearful ⬎ neutral; p ⬍ 0.05) (Table 2). Significantly greater activity for perceived fearful and disgusted expressions relative to perceived neutral expressions (fearful and
disgusted ⬎ neutral; p ⬍ 0.01) was also observed in left inferior
frontal gyrus (BA 44/45).
A number of regions showed a significantly greater activity for
perceived neutral faces regardless of the unperceived stimulus
(neutral ⬎ disgusted and fearful), including bilateral pgPFC (BA
32; left, p ⬍ 0.01; right, p ⬍ 0.001) (Fig. 4), right posterior cingulate cortex (BA 31; p ⬍ 0.001), bilateral middle frontal gyrus (BA
8/9; p ⬍ 0.001) (Fig. 5a,b), bilateral middle temporal gyrus (BA
21; p ⬍ 0.001), left superior temporal gyrus (BA 22; p ⬍ 0.001),
bilateral inferior parietal cortex (BA 40; p ⬍ 0.001) (Fig. 5c, left;
Fig. 5d, right), left superior parietal cortex (BA 7; p ⬍ 0.001), and
left superior occipital cortex (BA19; p ⬍ 0.001) (Table 2). With
the exception of left inferior parietal cortex, all regions showed no
significant differences in activity for perceived fearful faces relative to perceived disgusted faces. Left inferior parietal cortex (BA
40) showed significantly greater activity for neutral relative to
both fearful and disgusted faces and greater activity to fearful
than disgusted faces (neutral ⬎ fearful ⬎ disgusted; p ⬍ 0.05).
Main effect of unperceived emotion
There were no significant clusters observed for the main effect of
unperceived emotion ( p ⬍ 0.001).
Perceived emotion ⫻ unperceived emotion interaction
There were no significant clusters observed for the perceived
emotion ⫻ unperceived emotion interaction ( p ⬍ 0.001).
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Context-dependent connectivity analysis
Table 3 and Figure 6 show the results of the
functional connectivity analysis. Superior
temporal cortex (BA 36), middle temporal
cortex (BA 38), and superior parietal cortex
(BA 7) all showed enhanced functional connectivity with the right amygdala during trials of perceived fear relative to unperceived
fear ( p ⬍ 0.01). Conversely, the pgPFC (BA
32), superior frontal gyrus (BA 6), middle
frontal gyrus (BA 6), posterior cingulate
cortex (BA 13), middle temporal cortex (BA
21), and superior temporal cortex (BA 41)
all showed enhanced connectivity with the
right amygdala during trials of unperceived
fear relative to perceived fear ( p ⬍ 0.01).

Discussion
In the current study, binocular rivalry
was used to determine whether activity Figure 4. Perigenual prefrontal cortex activity associated with awareness of neutral relative to emotional stimuli. a, b, Images depictin top-down neural regions implicated ingthemaineffectofperceivedemotionrevealedgreateractivationintheright(a)andleft(b)perigenualprefrontalcortexwhenaneutral
¥
in visual awareness or emotion regula- expression was perceived relative to when either a fearful or disgusted expression was perceived (*p ⬍ 0.001, p ⬍ 0.01). The y-axis
depicts
percentage
signal
change
(%
sig.
change)
in
BOLD
response;
error
bars
depict
the
SEM
between
subjects.
tion vary as a function of consciousness.
We reasoned that if top-down contributions to consciousness functioned in a
stimulus-independent fashion, then activity in bottom-up (ventral visual system) but not top-down (frontoparietal)
structures should vary as a function of
the perceived emotion. When present,
fearful faces were significantly more
likely to be perceived than disgusted or
neutral faces. Despite gaining preferred
access to consciousness, the perception of
fearful relative to neutral faces was associated with less activity in top-down areas
considered critical for visual awareness. Enhanced activity in the amygdala and ventral visual stream was associated with fear
awareness. Whereas fear perception was associated with enhanced activity in the amygdala, increased pgPFC activity was observed
when fearful faces were present but unperceived. Similarly, whereas awareness of fear
was associated with increased functional
coupling between amygdala and temporal
cortices, trials featuring suppressed fearful
faces featured greater connectivity between
amygdala and pgPFC.
A distinction should be made between
stimulus representation, the focus of
studies of attention, and visual awareness,
Figure 5. Enhanced activity in a frontoparietal network associated with awareness of neutral relative to emotional stimuli.
which is targeted by the current study. At- a–d, Images depicting the main effect of perceived emotion revealed greater activation in the right (a) and left (b) middle frontal
tention enhances the neural representa- gyrus and the left (c) and right (d) inferior parietal cortices when a neutral relative to fearful or disgusted expression was perceived
tion of target stimuli (Desimone and (*p ⬍ 0.001, 8p ⬍ 0.05). e, f, The results of the contrast of emotion suppression [FN_N ⫹ DN_N] ⬎ neutral only condition (NN)
Duncan, 1995); it is considered a critical revealed greater activation in the right (e) middle frontal gyrus and the left (f ) middle frontal gyrus during emotion suppression.
precursor for awareness by some (Driver The y-axis depicts percentage signal change in BOLD response; error bars depict the SEM between subjects.
and Mattingley, 1998; Dehaene et al.,
awareness (Leopold and Logothetis, 1996). We controlled for
2006) and a potential confound by others
stimulus duration, location, and task demands across conditions
(Tse et al., 2005). Although the specific relationship between atto target processes related to emotional awareness. Nevertheless,
tention and consciousness remains unclear (Rees, 2007), it is
evident that enhanced representation is not sufficient to produce
awareness depended on correctly categorizing a facial expression

Amting et al. • Neural Correlates of Emotional Awareness

J. Neurosci., July 28, 2010 • 30(30):10039 –10047 • 10045

Table 3. Areas revealed by the functional connectivity analysis showing
significantly enhanced or reduced functional connectivity with the right
amygdala during fear awareness and fear suppression
Anatomical location
Regions showing greater amygdala connectivity
during perceived relative to unperceived fear
Superior parietal cortex
Middle temporal cortex
Superior temporal cortex
Regions showing greater amygdala connectivity
during unperceived relative to perceived fear
Superior frontal gyrus
Middle frontal gyrus
Perigenual PFC
Posterior cingulate cortex
Middle temporal cortex
Superior temporal cortex

L/R BA x

y

z

t value

25 ⫺70
45 5.14
42
7 ⫺13 5.52
40 ⫺32 ⫺7 5.39

R
R
R

7
38
36

L/R
L
L
L
L
L

6
1
8
6 ⫺29
6
32 ⫺4
54
31 ⫺8 ⫺69
21 ⫺64 ⫺12
41 ⫺62 ⫺28

70
66
8
18
⫺3
12

5.48
4.35
6.42
4.51
6.56
4.57

p ⬍ 0.01; L, left; R, right.

more likely to be perceived than other expressions, and this
awareness was associated with enhanced amygdala activity and
increased functional coupling between amygdala and ventral visual system. Other evidence supports this finding. Subliminal
emotional presentations modulate awareness for other stimuli
(de Gelder et al., 2005); furthermore, subcortical influences likely
contribute to residual emotion discrimination ability in affective
blindsight (de Gelder et al., 1999) and rapid emotional contagion
(Tamietto et al., 2009) for unseen stimuli in cortically blind patients. Furthermore, using signal detection theory, Pessoa et al.
(2006) revealed greater amygdala activity to seen versus unseen
fearful faces.
Although prior work has focused primarily on the extent to
which awareness is required for emotional stimuli to activate the
amygdala (Whalen et al., 1998; Pessoa et al., 2006), an alternate
perspective is that amygdala activity influences the threshold for
consciousness (Anderson and Phelps, 2001; Dehaene et al.,
2006). Accordingly, the amygdala may not only detect innate
biologically and socially relevant information (Sergerie et al., 2008) but also facilitate awareness of such stimuli by interacting
with phylogenetically newer systems. This
formulation would reconcile the seemingly
contradictory findings regarding the extent
to which awareness is necessary to activate
the amygdala. While not ruling out a necessary contribution from top-down structures, it raises the possibility that top-down
contributions vary as a function of the stimuli ultimately perceived or suppressed from
awareness.
Frontoparietal contributions to
consciousness vary as a function
of emotion
Our results shed light on how top-down
and bottom-up areas interact in some circumstances to influence consciousness.
Frontoparietal networks are thought to
make a generic (i.e., stimulus-independent) contribution to conscious perception (Lumer et al., 1998; Beck et al., 2001). We
observed greater activity in dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (BA
8/9) and, to a lesser degree, inferior parietal cortex (BA 40/7) to
perceived neutral relative to fearful or disgusted expressions. Despite being primed for awareness, fearful faces were associated with
less activity in neural regions thought to play a critical role in consciousness (and greater amygdala activity). One interpretation of
this finding is that the amygdala acts as a bottom-up amplifier
that increases accessibility of emotional items to consciousness.
Accordingly, because neutral stimuli would not benefit from similar bottom-up support, enhanced generic frontoparietal contributions become more important. This interpretation is
consistent with proposals that frontoparietal regions contribute
to consciousness by amplifying relevant sensory processes (Dehaene and Naccache, 2001; Sergent and Dehaene, 2004). It also
raises the possibility that the amygdala makes a similar (though
not sufficient) contribution to emotional awareness. However, it
should be noted that stronger visual cortical responses have been
observed for perceived compared with unperceived stimuli
(Moutoussis and Zeki, 2002). Thus, it remains possible that the
observed amygdala activity and enhanced functional coupling
with the ventral visual system was the result of fear awareness
rather than its cause.

Figure 6. Connectivity with the amygdala varies as a function of awareness. a–c, Context-dependent connectivity analysis
revealing areas with a significant modulation of functional connectivity with the right amygdala in the presence of perceived
fearful trials relative to unperceived fearful trials ( p ⬍ 0.01). Areas in orange and yellow show enhanced functional connectivity
during perceived fearful trials relative to unperceived fearful trials: right superior temporal cortex (a) and right middle temporal
cortex (b). Regions in blue show reduced functional connectivity with the right amygdala during perceived fearful trials relative to
unperceived fearful trials: left perigenual prefrontal cortex (c).

(an effortful process), and the possible effects of these task demands on the current results remains unclear. Although future
work that systematically varies cognitive demands will be needed
to address this problem, our primary findings are not likely
caused by a general emotion categorization difficulty effect. For
example, other studies show that frontoparietal activity increases
with heightened demands on attention, decision-making, or
rule-learning (Mitchell et al., 2007, 2009; Dumontheil et al.,
2010). However, we observed greatest frontoparietal activity to
neutral faces, which our behavioral results (reaction time and
error data) suggest were the easiest to classify in the absence of
emotional competition.
Emotion as a bottom-up influence on conscious perception
It has been suggested that emotion acts as a bottom-up influence
on stimulus representation, giving affective stimuli enhanced access to processing resources (Pessoa and Ungerleider, 2004; Blair
and Mitchell, 2009). This influence is not sufficient to produce
awareness; robust amygdala activity has been observed even
when emotional awareness is reduced because of masking
(Whalen et al., 1998; Morris et al., 1999) or cortical blindness
(Morris et al., 2001; Pegna et al., 2005). One possibility is that the
amygdala’s response to fear is entirely independent of awareness.
However, in the current study fearful faces were significantly
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Implications for emotion regulation
The current results have implications for our understanding of
emotion regulation. One proposed mechanism for emotion regulation involves projections between medial prefrontal cortex
(mPFC) and basolateral amygdala. The mPFC is thought to regulate affect by modulating emotional output from the amygdala
(Morgan et al., 1993; Rosenkranz and Grace, 2001). Furthermore, enhanced activity in mPFC is associated with reduced
emotional distracter processing (Bishop et al., 2004) and successful emotional reappraisal (Ochsner et al., 2004). However, little is
known about how activation of this system may vary as a function
of awareness. In the present study, we found that activity in pgPFC was enhanced during the conscious perception of neutral
relative to emotional facial expressions. Furthermore, the suppression of fearful stimuli from consciousness was associated
with enhanced coupling between pgPFC and amygdala. These
findings raise the intriguing possibility that activity in pgPFC may
influence not only how one feels about a particular stimulus but
also whether or not an emotional stimulus is accessible to awareness. An alternative possibility is that information about the presence of fearful stimuli is conveyed from amygdala to pgPFC, and
it is in the latter structure that competition for emotional awareness is ultimately resolved.
Relationship to other binocular rivalry studies of emotion
It is important to note that the current study differs in several key
ways from prior binocular rivalry studies suggesting that amygdala activity is resistant to manipulations of awareness (Anderson
et al., 2003; Williams et al., 2004). First, in these studies awareness
of emotion was not the target process; emotional representation
occurred incidentally while participants made other perceptual
judgments (e.g., gender discriminations). The focus of these
studies, therefore, was on emotional representation as a function
of awareness rather than awareness of emotion per se. To our
knowledge, this is the only fMRI study of binocular rivalry that
targets awareness of emotionality within the same class of stimuli.
Furthermore, whereas the current study involved competition
between two faces for awareness, prior studies involved rivalry
between faces and places. The use of two social stimuli that activate similar areas within the ventral stream may have enhanced
competition. Indeed, we have noted previously that competition
between discordant emotional expressions modulates the BOLD
response in the ventral stream (Amting et al., 2009). It should be
noted that by using face-only rivalry in the current study, we may
have unintentionally increased perceptual fusion of the compound stimuli, with only piecemeal rivalry in parts of the face
with the greatest discrepancy. The potential implications of this
for our results remain unclear.
Conclusions
Considerable research supports the idea that contributions from
the ventral visual system to consciousness vary in a categoryselective manner. However, to date little evidence exists that contributions from frontoparietal areas considered critical for
consciousness are also variable. Here, we show that activity in
these regions can vary as a function of the emotion perceived and
suppressed from awareness. Strikingly, although fearful stimuli
were more likely to be perceived when present, this increased
awareness was associated with reduced activity in regions of frontoparietal cortices thought to play a critical and general role in
consciousness. These results are consistent with the idea that the
amygdala modulates the threshold for awareness of emotional
stimuli. Evidence is also provided that activity in regions of pg-

PFC, previously implicated in extinguishing a fear-conditioned
response and in explicit emotion regulation, is associated with the
suppression of fearful faces from consciousness. The results have
implications for models of consciousness, emotion regulation,
and the relationship between amygdala activation and visual
awareness.
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